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Abstract—This paper deals with active fingerprinting a.k.a.
traitor tracing where a collusion of dishonest users merges their
individual versions of a content to yield a pirated copy. The
Tardos codes are one of the most powerful tools to fight against
such collusion process by identifying the colluders.
Instead of studying as usual the necessary and sufficient code
length in a theoretical setup, we adopt the point of view of the
practitioner. We call this the operational mode, i.e. a practical
setup where a Tardos code has already been deployed and a
pirated copy has been found.
This new paradigm shows that the known bounds on the
probability of accusing an innocent in the theoretical setup
are way too pessimistic. Indeed the practitioner can resort to
much tighter bounds because the problem is fundamentally much
simpler under the operational mode.
In the end, we benchmark under the operational mode several
single decoders recently proposed in the literature. We believe
this is a fair comparison reflecting what matters in reality.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tardos codes are the most popular fingerprinting codes,
being the subject of a strong and living literature. From its
invention in 2003 by G. Tardos, it has been deeply studied
from the information theoretical and the statistical points of
view, with many possible extensions. This paper sheds some
light with a different angle: the operational mode.
In a nutshell, a typical theoretical paper about Tardos codes
(like [16], [14], [15], [12], [10]) can be seen as mathematical
function whose inputs are the following requirements:
• n the number of users,
• c the size of the collusion,
• ✏1 the probability of accusing a given innocent user,
• ✏2 the probability of missing a given guilty user.
The output is the necessary code length m to fulfill the above
requirements: the theoretical paper proves that if m is bigger
than M(n, c, ✏1, ✏2), then whatever the attack strategy of the
colluders, we will almost surely trace back some colluders
while not accusing an innocent.
The main contribution of our paper is to stress that this
setup is valid for a theoretical study, but it doesn’t capture
what matters at the decoder side in real life applications.
Sect. II presents the shift of paradigm from the theoretical
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setup to what we call the operational mode and lists the main
differences between the two points of view.
The value of utmost importance in the operational mode is
the probability that an innocent user has a score higher than
a given threshold. Sect. III reviews well-known upper bounds
on and estimators of this probability. Some of them have been
already used in classical Tardos codes theoretical literature.
We here show how these bounds get more accurate in the
operational mode. Another contribution is the introduction of
other bounds dedicated to this new paradigm.
A third contribution is a comparison of several provably
good single decoders recently proposed in the literature. It
is somewhat difficult to compare them because their inventors
claim optimality under different criteria. Our benchmark tuned
for the operational mode provides a fair comparison in Sect. V.
II. TARDOS CODE: THEORY VS. PRACTICE
To make our point clear, we shall start with some classical
notations for a binary Tardos code.
A. Notations
A is a random variable with expectation E(A) and variance
V(A), a is a scalar, and a denotes vector (a1, . . . , am). For
any integer m   1, [m] denotes the set {1, . . . ,m}.
The code designer first randomly draws a vector p =
(p1, . . . , pm) whose components are random variables in-
dependently distributed with a probability density function
f⌧ : P⌧ ! R+. The support of function f⌧ is P⌧ =
(⌧, 1   ⌧) ⇢ (0, 1). Vector p is often called the bias vector
and it must be kept secret. The integer m is the length of the
code. Any user j willing to receive a copy is associated to a
binary codeword xj = (x1,j , . . . , xm,j). The i-th bit xi,j is
the result of a random draw according to Bernoulli law B(pi)
(i.e. P(Xi,j = x) = pxi (1  pi)(1 x)). This bit is independent
from the other symbols of xj and of the other codewords. The
code is denoted by X = {xj}nj=1 and it must be kept secret
in the sense that user j might only know xj .
A watermarking technique embeds the m-bit codeword xj
in the content and the results is sent to user j. A group of
c dishonest users, so called collusion and denoted by C, then
merges their copies in order to forge a pirated copy with the
hope that none of them can be traced back.
Once a pirated copy is found, the watermark decoder
extracts the sequence y = (y1, . . . , ym). A tracing algorithm
has the three following inputs (y,p,X ). It aims at identifying
some guilty users, i.e. the members of the collusion. To do
so, it computes a score sj for any user j and it accuses those
whose score is above a given threshold z.
B. Tardos code in theory
Most papers dealing with Tardos codes adopt an information
theoretical or statistical point of view. They are based on a
setup where the above mentioned variables are modeled as
random variables: P,Xj ,Y, Sj . In the binary case, they often
assume a statistical model ✓c = (✓0,c, . . . , ✓c,c) capturing the
nature of the collusion attack [6]:
✓s,c = P
0@Yi = 1|X
j2C
Xj,i = s
1A , 8s 2 {0, . . . , c}. (1)
In words, ✓s,c is the probability that we decode symbol ‘1’ at
indexes where the colluders have s times out of c symbol ‘1’.
Without loss of generality, we restrict our analysis to the
case where the tracing algorithm is based on a single decoder.
This means that the score of user j doesn’t depend on the
code X other than by his codeword Xj . This implies that
Sj = G(Xj ,Y,P) is a random variables with complex
dependencies on Xj ,Y, and P.
Assuming at most c colluders among n users, a typical
theoretical paper exhibits a density f⌧ and a threshold z s.t.:
P(Sj /2C > z) < ✏1, [Proof of soundness] (2)
P(Sj2C < z) < ✏2, [Proof of completeness] (3)
whatever the collusion attack, provided that the code length is
bigger thanm = M(n, c, ✏1, ✏2). The threshold z is ‘universal’
in the sense that for any occurrence taken by P, Xj , and Y
complying with the theoretical model, (2) and (3) hold.
C. Tardos code in practice
In words, a theoretical paper takes the point of view of the
code designer willing to deploy a fingerprinting solution. In
this paper, the operational mode denotes the point of view of
the decoder where a system has already been deployed.
In the operational mode, the setup of is very different: A
content has been distributed to n users. The watermarking
technique in use has a given bitrate 1/`: it hides a binary
symbol in a robust and imperceptible manner in every `-
samples of content (expressed in seconds, pixels, etc. ). Given
the size L of the content, the code length is thus m = L/`.
Therefore, m is not an output, i.e. a parameter depending on
other parameters, but an input in our scenario.
The decoder might not know the distribution f⌧ or how
suitable is this f⌧ . It only knows p and X . The decoder has a
priori no clue on the collusion size c and the collusion strategy.
It only observes its result y. However, it must not accuse a
given innocent user or with a probability at most ✏1. This
means that it should automatically ‘notice’ and give up when
the code length or the distribution f⌧ is not suitable for reliably
accusing colluders in the observed context. To summarize, the
inputs of the problem in practice are (n,m,p,y,X , ✏1).
In the operational mode, there is thus no randomness. How-
ever, since we don’t know which codewords in X contributed
to the forgery y, we consider that the codeword of an innocent
is a random variable X distributed according to the secret bias
vector p: Xi ⇠ B(pi), 8i 2 [m]. The score of this innocent is
random and equals S = G(X,y,p). We drop the index j to
insist on the fact that X and S are not related to a given user
in particular, but are related to an innocent in general. Please,
note that in the operational mode, there is only one source of
randomness in the score computation.
This shift of paradigm deeply modifies the goal of the study.
We no longer look for a ‘universal’ threshold z guarantee-
ing (2) and (3) for any realizations of X, P and Y, but
a particular threshold that only holds for y and p. We can
do even better than this. Ultimately, we look for a function
that maps the score sj of user j to a probability of being
innocent, depending on the observations y and p. In Sect. IV,
we propose the following mapping ⇧(sj) = P(S > sj |y,p).
III. BOUNDS AND ESTIMATIONS
This section reviews some techniques for bounding or esti-
mating the probability that the score of an innocent is bigger
than a threshold. We focus on single decoders with linear
score: sj =
Pm
i=1 ui, where ui = g(xj,i, yi, pi). Function g is
called the accusation score function. There is a vast literature
about probabilities upper bounds for sums of independent
random variables. The book [2] is dedicated to this subject.
Most of them are meant for random variables with bounded
support like (4) and (5) detailed hereafter.
A. Bounds for the theoretical setup
In the theoretical setup, S =
Pm
i=1 Ui with Ui =
g(Xi, Yi, Pi). Thanks to the code construction, Ui are mutually
independent. Bounding the probabilities dealing with score has
been the core of theoretical proofs in Tardos code literature.
Yet, it is not easy to find tight bounds because Ui is a continu-
ous random variable with a complex law due to its dependency
onXi, Pi, and Yi. The Ph.D. thesis of A. Simone [13] is indeed
devoted to the study of the distribution of Ui.
1) Tardos’ inequality: In his seminal paper [16], Tardos
uses this bound: If 9 b > 0 s.t. Ui E(Ui) < b, 8i 2 [m], then
P(S > z) =
8<: e 
(z E(S))2
2
P
i V(Ui) if z < 3.4
P
i V(Ui)
b + E(S)
e 
1.7(z E(S))
b +
2.89
P
i V(Ui)
b2 otherwise.
(4)
2) Bernstein’s inequality: Bernstein’s inequality has been
recently proposed as an alternative of (4) to simplify
proofs [15]. If 9 b > 0 such that |Ui| < b, 8i 2 [m], then
P(S > z)  exp
✓
  (z   E(S))
2/2P
i V(Ui) + b(z   E(S))/3
◆
. (5)
In the theoretical setup, these bounds are very relevant for
accusation score function (14), because for an innocent user,
E(S) = nE(Ui) = 0 and V(Ui) = 1 whatever the collusion
attack. Besides, since by construction ⌧ < Pi < 1   ⌧ , we
have |Ui| < b =
p
(1  ⌧)/⌧ . However, as soon as we use
a different accusation score function, all these nice properties
vanish and the expectation and variance of Ui do depend on the
collusion strategy, unknown at the decoder side. This explains
the long lasting success of score function (14).
B. Bounds for the operational mode
In the operational mode, we now have Ui = g(Xi, pi, yi)
where (pi, yi) are known and Xi ⇠ B(pi). R.v. Ui is now dis-
crete taking two values, ai = g(0, pi, yi) and bi = g(1, pi, yi):
Ui = (bi   ai)Xi + ai. (6)
This simplifies a lot the bounds. For instance, Ui has for
expectation and variance:
E(Ui) = ai + pi(bi   ai), (7)
V(Ui) = pi(1  pi)(bi   ai)2, (8)
which in turn gives E(S) =
Pm
i=1 E(Ui) and V(S) =Pm
i=1 V(Ui) thanks to the mutual independence. Setting b =
maxi(max(|ai|, |bi|)), we can now apply the previous bounds
even if the accusation score function is not given by (14) and
without knowing the collusion attack. Another approach is to
benefit from bounds dedicated to binary r.v. Ui as in (6).
1) Kearns and Saul’s inequality [9, Th. 2]: For all 1  i 
m, denote di = bi   ai. Then, for z > E(S):
P(S > z) < exp
✓
  (z   E(S))
2Pm
i=1  i
◆
(9)
where  i =
⇢
2d2i if pi = 1/2
d2i
1 2pi
log(1 pi) log(pi) otherwise.
(10)
2) Cramer-Chernoff’s inequality [2, Sect. 2.2]: The
Cramer-Chernoff’s bounding method has no closed form but
requires a simple numerical optimization in the binary case.
For   > 0, Markov inequality yields:
P(S > z) < exp( ( z   S( ))) (11)
where  S( ) denotes the logarithm of the moment generat-
ing function:  S( ) = log(E(e S)). Thanks to the mutual
independence,  S( ) =
Pm
i=1 Ui( ). From (6), it comes
 Ui( ) =   pi(bi   ai) + log
⇣
1 + pie
 (bi ai)   p
⌘
. (12)
We then use Matlab to find out  ? > 0 giving the tightest
bound, i.e. maximizing the quantity [ z   S( )].
C. Estimation for the operational mode
The above inequalities apply to scores if the decoder is
single and linear. Yet, we also consider non linear single
decoders (18) and (19) in our benchmark. Another approach
is to estimate the probability P(S > z).
1) Monte Carlo: A naive method is a Monte-Carlo simu-
lation. It consists in generating N new codewords {x˜j}Nj=1.
Sequence y was forged before, they are codewords of innocent
‘users’. An estimation is Pˆ(S > z) = N 1|{j|G(x˜j ,p,y) >
z}|. This is not efficient as N = O(1/P(S > z)) which
becomes intractable if P(S > z) < 10 9.
2) Rare event simulation: A faster algorithm was proposed
in [3] which is based on rare event simulation. We don’t
describe it here and refer the reader to [3] for a complete
description, [8] for the proof of its properties, and [5] for a
Matlab implementation. Its key properties are that its estima-
tion only consumes O(  logP(S > z)) scores computation
and it provides a   confidence interval [P ( ), P (+)]. In the
sequel, we use the pessimistic estimation Pˆ(S > z) = P (+)
for   = 0.95. There is a probability of (1  )/2 = 0.025 that
P (+) is indeed not an upper bound of P(S > z).
D. Examples
To illustrate the difference between the theoretical setup
and the operational mode, we have generated a sequence p
of length m = 1, 024 with a density f⌧ , and c = 6 codewords
colluding via the interleaving attack (✓s,c = s/c). Figures 1
and 2 show the bounds and the estimations on P(S > z) for
the accusation score functions (14) (⌧ = 3.3 ⇤ 10 4) and (15)
(⌧ = 3.3 ⇤ 10 3) respectively.
As for the theoretical setup in fig. 1, the Tardos’ bound
is slightly tighter than the Bernstein inequality. The merit of
this last bound only lies in the simplification of the proof of
soundness [15]. These bounds are tighter in the operational
mode than in the theoretical setup. However, the difference is
tiny for Bernstein’s inequality. The Cramer-Chernoff method
offers the best bound at the cost of a numerical optimization.
In fig. 2, the inequalities (4) and (5) in the theoretical
setup have two major drawbacks: i) since the accusation score
function in use is not (14), they need to know the collusion
attack to compute E(Ui) and V(Ui), ii) they are dramatically
loose. In the operational mode, drawback i) no longer holds,
but they are still very weak compared to the Kearn and Saul’s
inequality. Again the Cramer-Chernoff’s method offers the
best bound at the cost of a numerical optimization lasting
⇡ 0.5s on our Matlab implementation.
The Monte Carlo simulation generates N = 106 codewords
and scores, which takes ⇡ 16s to estimate a probability
down to 10 5. The most reliable tool for estimating very low
P(S > z) is the rare event simulation, which takes ⇡ 11s for
probabilities down to 10 11. It is also the only approach that
tackles scores which are not linear as described in Appendix B.
IV. A NEW DECODING RULE
The inequalities and estimation techniques under the oper-
ational setup offer new rules at the decoder side.
A. Adaptive threshold
The figures 1 and 2 were obtained under the theoretical
setup and the operational mode, i.e. for a single run of a Tardos
code simulation. They are thus specific for those particular
realizations p and y. From one run to another, the gap between
the bounds (4) and (5) for the theoretical setup (valid for any
(p,y)) and the bounds or estimation in the operational mode
(specific to (p,y)) is more or less large. But the latter are
always more precise and this has a dramatic impact of the
decoding performances.
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Fig. 1. Bounds, for the theoretical setup (blue) and the operational mode
(black), and estimations (red) of P(S > z) for accusation score function (14).
The minimum and the maximum of the c = 6 colluder scores are shown with
dotted vertical lines.
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Fig. 2. Bounds, for the theoretical setup (blue) and the operational mode
(black), and estimations (red) for accusation score function (15). The mini-
mum and the maximum of the c = 6 colluder scores are shown with dotted
vertical lines.
Suppose that we set ✏1 = 10 9 and ✏2 = 1/2. The
figures 1 and 2 show that m is not large enough to fulfill
the requirements of the theoretical setup as stated in Sect. I:
✏1 = 10 9 implies a threshold z way too big to be on the
figures according to the Tardos or Bernstein’s inequalities
(blue curves). At least for this realization of the code and
pirated sequence y, no colluders get caught because the
maximum of the colluders scores is much smaller than z.
The conclusion is very different in the operational mode.
The Cramer-Chernoff bound or the rare event estimator give
a customized threshold z(y,p) such that P(S > z(y,p)) <
✏1 which lies in between the minimum and the maximum of
the colluder scores. Therefore, at least one colluder is caught
in fig. 1 and 2. The notation z(y,p) stresses the fact that this
threshold is only valid for these realizations of (p,y).
B. Probability of being innocent
Fig. 1 and 2 also offer a way to map a score s onto a
probability of being innocent ⇡ = ⇧(s). For user j, the bounds
or estimations of Sect. III yield a probability ⇡j = ⇧(sj) =
P(S > sj), which reads as the probability that the score of an
innocent is higher than sj . More precisely, they provide upper
bounds mapping of the probability of being innocent with
different tightness. In fig. 1, the probability that an innocent
has a score as big as the maximum of the colluders’ scores is
around 10 2 according to Tardos’ bound. Nobody would take
the risk of accusing him if the probability of being wrong is
only 10 2. Yet, the rare event estimation yields a probability
around 10 14, which raises much suspicion.
This stresses the fact that we especially need tight bounds
or accurate estimations for the biggest user scores. Figures 1
and 2 show that the bounds of the theoretical setup fail
achieving this goal. As for the estimators, the computational
inefficacy of the Monte-Carlo approach prevents accurate
mapping for too big scores.
A tight mapping is very helpful to decide whether users
with the biggest scores are to be accused because it is
more meaningful than raw scores or their comparisons to a
threshold. However, the probability ⇡j has to be related to the
number of users n: The bigger n, the more likely at least one
innocent user has a small ⇡j . Indeed if c⌧ n, the probability
that at least one innocent user has a mapping as low as ⇡j
(equivalently a score as big as sj) is ⌘j = 1   (1   ⇡j)n. In
fig. 1, the biggest colluders’ score yields ⌘j ⇡ n⇡j = 10 8 if
n = 106, which clears any doubt about his guiltiness.
V. BENCHMARK
This section compares the powers of the single decoders
listed in appendix A.
A. Experimental setups
The code is constructed as described in Sect. II-A with the
usual clipped arcsine distribution [16]:
f⌧ (p) =
1
2 arcsin(1  2⌧)pp(1  p) , 8p 2 P⌧ . (13)
We consider two setups with short and long codes. In setup
A, m = 256, c = 3, ⌧ = 5.5 ⇤ 10 4, and cmax = 6. In setup
B, m = 1, 024, c = 6, ⌧ = 3.3 ⇤ 10 4, and cmax = 10.
Parameter cmax is needed for decoders (16), (18), and (19).
In a nutshell, these latter decoders bet that there is no use in
looking for more than cmax colluders for such a code length.
These decoders are facing the following collusion attacks:
Coin flip, all-1, all-0, interleaving, WCA, majority, and minor-
ity (see their definition in [6]). WCA is theoretically the worst
case attack ✓?c defined in [7] as the minimizer of the averaged
mutual information per sample EP (I(Y ;X|P )) for P ⇠ f⌧ .
B. Benchmark of decoders for a fixed f⌧
Our benchmark is composed of Nr = 200 runs. A run starts
by generating p and c colluder codewords {xj}cj=1, which
then forge y according to a given attack. The decoders con-
sidered in this benchmark compute the scores {sj}cj=1 for this
particular y. Their minimum smin and maximum smax are then
translated into probabilities ⇧(smin) and ⇧(smax) respectively
thanks to the rare event simulator. We use the upper bound of
its confidence interval as explained in Sect. III-C2.
Figures 3 and 4 show some statistics (median, 5% and 95%
quantiles) about ⇧(smin) and ⇧(smax) over Nr simulation
runs. Therefore, the best decoder is the one providing the
smallest probabilities, which will trigger accusation.
For the first attacks (Coin flip, all-1, all-0, interleaving and
WCA), decoders (16), (18), and (19) perform better. However,
decoder (16) is weaker under the minority attack, whereas
decoder (18) has troubles with the majority attack in Fig. 4 .
If we assume that n = 104 with ⌘ = 10 2 under setup A, user
j is accused if ⇡j . 10 6. Only the decoders (18) and (19)
succeed to accuse at least one colluder with a probability 1/2
(i.e. the median of ⇧(smax) is smaller than 10 6) for all the
tested attacks. If we assume that n = 106 with ⌘ = 10 2
under setup B, user j is accused if ⇡j . 10 8. Only the
decoder (19) succeeds to accuse at least one colluder with a
probability 1/2, for all the tested attacks. Note however that
the aggregated decoders (18) and (19) compute cmax times
more scores than the other linear decoders (see Appendix B).
Finally, T. Laarhoven has discovered that his decoder (16)
doesn’t need a cutoff: It can handle f⌧ with ⌧ = 0. Indeed, this
also holds for decoders (18) and (19). However, we report that
our benchmark with ⌧ = 0 shows a slight degradation of the
performances for these three decoders. Here is the explanation:
mutual information I(X;Y |p) is weak for small p (or small
1   p) and c not so large. Thus, generating too small pi (or
1 pi) ruins the averaged mutual information EP (I(Y ;X|P )).
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper motivates a shift of paradigm in the study of
binary Tardos codes which occurs when taking the point of
view at the decoder side. This new paradigm allows much
more powerful bounds and estimations of the probability of
accusing an innocent. It reveals that the bounds of the literature
are very loose artificially increasing the necessary code length.
A benchmark under the operational mode compares some
decoders recently proposed. It promotes the work of Des-
oubeaux et al. [4], which has so far received little attention.
Future works include the study of the Worst Case Forgery
y for a given p and {xj}j2C (contrary to the Worst Case
Attack ✓?k). The extension of our work to soft output water-
marking decoder or to erasure / double symbols detection is
straightforward. Yet, the extension to q-ary alphabet Tardos
codes deserves deeper investigations.
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APPENDIX
We consider the following single decoders of two kinds:
linear decoders and generalized linear decoders.
A. Linear decoders
A single decoder is linear if the score is a sum over m in-
dexes: sj =
Pm
i=1 ui with ui = g(xj,i, yi, pi). The accusation
score function is the name of g : {0, 1}⇥ {0, 1}⇥ P⌧ ! R.
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Fig. 3. Benchmark of single decoders under setup A: (T) Tardos (14),
(O) Oosterwijk (15), (L) Laarhoven (16), (M) Meerwald (18), (D) Des-
oubeaux (19). Statistics of log10(⇧(smin)) (blue) and log10(⇧(smax))
(red): Median (4), 5% quantile (⇤), and 95% quantile (+).
1) Tardos-Skoric: Function g is given by:
g(x, y, p) =
⇢ p
(1  p)(2y 1)p(1 2y) if x = y,
 pp(2y 1)(1  p)(1 2y) if x 6= y. (14)
To bound its amplitude, we need to enforce P⌧ = [⌧, 1   ⌧ ],
where 0 < ⌧ < 1/2 is the cutoff parameter. This function is
optimal in the sense that, whatever the collusion attack, we
have E(Ui) = 0 and V(Ui) = 1 allowing a straightforward
application of bounds (4) and (5). Tardos initially proposed
this function [16], later on generalized by Skoric et al. [14].
2) Oosterwijk et al. : Function g is given by [12, Eq. (43)]:
g(x, y, p) =
⇢
p y(1  p)y 1   1 if x = y,
 1 if x 6= y. (15)
To bound its amplitude, we need to enforce a cutoff ⌧ > 0.
This is optimal in the sense that it yields a saddle-point in the
performance indicator E(
P
j2C Sj)/
p
V(Sj /2C) [12, Th. 2],
and that it is capacity-achieving [12, Prop. 17].
3) Laarhoven: Function g is given by [10, Eq. (2)]:
g(x, y, p) =
8<: log
✓
1 + 1c
⇣
1 p
p
⌘(2y 1)◆
if x = y,
log(1  c 1) if x 6= y.
(16)
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Fig. 4. Benchmark of single decoders under setup B: (T) Tardos (14),
(O) Oosterwijk (15), (L) Laarhoven (16), (M) Meerwald (18), (D) Des-
oubeaux (19). Statistics of log10(⇧(smin)) (blue) and log10(⇧(smax))
(red): Median (4), 5% quantile (⇤), and 95% quantile (+).
This is optimal in the sense that it is capacity-achieving [10,
Prop. 3]. Morever, there is no longer need of a cut-off
parameter, i.e. P = (0, 1) [10, Th. 4]. Yet, the decoder needs to
know c. In our simulation, the decoder bets that the collusion
size is lower or equal to cmax, i.e. c is replaced by cmax in (16).
4) MAP: This decoder is also known as ML or Neyman-
Pearson decoder. The accusation function is given by:
g✓c(x, y, p) = log
✓
P(Y = y|x, p,✓c)
(Y = y|p,✓c)
◆
(17)
The expression of the probabilities can be found in [7, Eq. (8-
9)]. This is the best decoder to decide whether a given user
is guilty from a statistical point of view. Yet, it needs the
collusion size and attack model ✓c, which is not realistic in
practice. Therefore, it is not part of our benchmark.
B. Generalized linear decoders
A decoder is a generalized linear decoder if the score is an
aggregation of several linear scores: sj = A(s
(1)
j , . . . , s
(K)
j ),
with K < +1 and A : RK ! R.
1) Meerwald & Furon: The decoder bets that there are at
most cmax colluders. The aggregation function is the maximum
operator:
sj = max(s
(1)
j . . . , s
(cmax)
j ), (18)
where s(k)j is the linear score based on the accusation function
g✓?k in (17) with ✓
?
k being the worst case attack for a collusion
of size k: ✓?k = argmin✓k EP (I(Y ;X|p,✓k)). This decoder
proposed in [11] is capacity achieving thanks to theorem 1
in [1] on communication through compound channels.
2) Desoubeaux et al. : The decoder bets that there are at
most cmax colluders. The aggregation is the following:
sj = log
 
cmaxX
k=1
k. exp s(k)j
!
, (19)
where s(k)j is the linear score based on the accusation function
g✓k given in (17) with ✓k = (0, 1/2, . . . , 1/2, 1), i.e. the
‘Coin flip’ attack. This decoder is optimal in the sense of
a Bayesian decoder with the less informative prior on the
collusion attack [4].
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